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a b s t r a c t
Constrained matrix games with payoffs of triangular fuzzy numbers (TFNs) are a type
of matrix games with payoffs expressed by TFNs and sets of players’ strategies which
are constrained. So far as we know, no study have yet been attempted for constrained
matrix games with payoffs of TFNs since there is no effective way to simultaneously
incorporate the payoffs’ fuzziness and strategies’ constraints into classical and/or fuzzy
matrix game methods. The aim of this paper is to develop an effective methodology for
solving constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs. In this methodology, we introduce
the concepts of Alpha-constrainedmatrix games for constrainedmatrix gameswith payoffs
of TFNs and the values. By the duality theorem of linear programming, it is proven
that players’ gain-floor and loss-ceiling always have a common interval-type value and
hereby any Alpha-constrained matrix game has an interval-type value. Moreover, using
the representation theorem for the fuzzy set, it is proven that any constrainedmatrix game
with payoffs of TFNs always has a TFN-type fuzzy value. The auxiliary linear programming
models are derived to compute the lower and upper bounds of the interval-type value
and optimal strategies of players for any Alpha-constrained matrix game. In particular, the
mean and the lower and upper limits of the TFN-type fuzzy value of any constrainedmatrix
gamewith payoffs of TFNs can be directly obtained through solving the derived three linear
programmingmodelswith data taken fromonly 1-cut and0-cut of payoffs. Hereby the TFN-
type fuzzy value of any constrainedmatrix gamewith payoffs of TFNs are easily computed.
The proposed method in this paper is compared with other methods and its validity and
applicability are illustrated with a numerical example.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Antagonistic situations arise in many parts of real life and game theory gives a mathematical background for dealing
with such conflicting events. There are diverse kinds of mathematical games [1–15]. Two-person zero-sum finite games,
which often are called matrix games for short, are an important kind of non-cooperative games. Matrix games have been
extensively studied and successfully applied to many fields such as economics, finance, business competition, voting,
auctions, research and development races, cartel behavior and e-commerce as well as advertising. In matrix games, payoffs
of outcomes are made precise common knowledge to both players. In reality, however, the certainty assumption is not
realistic in many antagonistic decision occasions. In fact, in real antagonistic situations, players are not able to estimate
exactly payoffs of outcomes in the game due to lack of adequate information and/or imprecision of the available information
on the environments [16–27]. For example, different advertising strategies of two competing companies lead to different
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market shares and themarket sharesmust be estimated by using approximate values rather than exact values [28]. This lack
of precision and certaintymay be appropriatelymodeled by using the fuzzy set [29,30].What ismore, in some real-life game
problems, choice of strategies for players is constrained due to some practical reason why this should be, i.e., not all mixed
strategies in a game are permitted for each player [1,31]. Such a two-person zero-sum finite game with payoffs expressed
by triangular fuzzy numbers (TFNs) is called a matrix game with sets of constrained strategies and payoffs of TFNs, which
often is called a constrainedmatrix gamewith payoffs of TFNs for short. Dresher [31] gave a real example of the constrained
matrix game with crisp payoffs. Li [32] and Li and Cheng [33] studied the constrained matrix games with fuzzy payoffs,
which also are called fuzzy constrainedmatrix games. The focus of this paper is restricted to constrainedmatrix games with
payoffs of TFNs.
Obviously, a constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs is remarkably different from a classical matrix game or fuzzy
matrix game in that the former simultaneously involves the payoffs’ fuzziness and strategies’ constraints. Any classical
matrix game always has a value and optimal mixed strategies of players, which are desirable and can be easily obtained
by solving a pair of primal–dual linear programming models [1]. However, there is no effective method which can always
ensure that any fuzzy matrix game has a fuzzy value. In addition, the obtained (defuzzification) values of a fuzzy matrix
game and optimal mixed strategies closely depend on specific methods or ranking functions [5–11]. These conclusions are
not rational and effective from viewpoints of both the ‘‘zero-sum’’ concept of a matrix game and logic that players’ expected
payoffs should be fuzzy since they are a linear combination of fuzzy payoffs [12–15,28]. Thus, the methods of classical and
fuzzy matrix games are not applicable to constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs. As far as we know, in fact, there is
no effective method for solving constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs. In this paper, we introduce the concepts of
α-constrained matrix games for the constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs and the values. By the duality theorem
of linear programming, we prove that players’ gain-floor and loss-ceiling always have a common interval-type value and
hereby any α-constrained matrix game has an interval-type value, which is rational from viewpoints of logic of interval
operations and the feature of zero-sum games. Hereby it is proven that any constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs
always has a fuzzy value, which is also a TFN. These conclusions are useful and rational from viewpoints of both logic of TFN
operations and the ‘‘zero-sum’’ concept of matrix games. The auxiliary linear programming models are derived to compute
the interval-type value and optimal mixed strategies of players for any α-constrained matrix game. In particular, the mean
and the lower and upper limits of the fuzzy value of any constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs can be directly
obtained through solving the derived three linear programmingmodelswith data taken fromonly 1-cut and 0-cut of payoffs.
Furthermore, the TFN-type fuzzy value of any constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs can be explicitly obtained by
the representation theorem for the fuzzy set. In addition, it is shown that the derived linear programming models in this
paper extend those of constrained matrix games and classical matrix games.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some notations and definitions such as TFNs,
α-cuts and constrainedmatrix games aswell as auxiliary linear programmingmodels. In Section 3,we formulate constrained
matrix games with payoffs of TFNs and give the concepts of α-constrained matrix games and the values. It is proven that
any α-constrained matrix game always has an interval-type value and hereby any constrained matrix game with payoffs of
TFNs has a TFN-type value. The auxiliary linear programming models are constructed to solve any constrained matrix game
with payoffs of TFNs. In Section 4, implementation and comparison of the proposed method in this paper are conducted
with a numerical example. Conclusion is made in Section 5.
2. Notations and definitions
2.1. Constrained matrix games and auxiliary linear programming models
In some real game problems, choice of pure and/or mixed strategies for each player is constrained due to some practical
reason why this should be [1,3,31–33], i.e., not all pure and/or mixed strategies in a game are permitted for each player.
Such a type of matrix games often is called constrained matrix games. Mathematically, a constrained matrix game may be
described as follows. Assume that S1 = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δm} and S2 = {β1, β2, . . . , βn} are sets of pure strategies for players I
and II, respectively. A payoff matrix of player I is concisely expressed as A = (aij)m×n. Players I and II must respectively
choose their mixed strategies y = (y1, y2, . . . , ym)T and z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn)T from some convex polyhedrons, which
algebraically are called constrained sets determined by some systems of linear inequalities and/or equations. Without
loss of generality, let Y = {y|BTy ≤ c, y ≥ 0} represent the constrained set of mixed strategies for player I, where
c = (c1, c2, . . . , cp)T, B = (bil)m×p and p is a positive integer. Let Z = {z|Ez ≥ d, z ≥ 0} denote the constrained set
of strategies for player II, where d = (d1, d2, . . . , dq)T, E = (ekj)q×n and q is a positive integer. It is noticed that a pure
strategy is a special case of a mixed strategy. Thus, the pure strategies δi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) and βj (j = 1, 2, . . . , n)may be
regarded as being included in the constrained sets Y and Z of mixed strategies, respectively.
Since y is a mixed strategy, it must satisfy the condition:
m
i=1 yi = 1. Obviously,
m
i=1 yi = 1 is equivalent to bothm
i=1 yi ≤ 1 and−
m
i=1 yi ≤ −1. Thus, the system of inequalities and/or equalities BTy ≤ c includes both
m
i=1 yi ≤ 1 and
−mi=1 yi ≤ −1, i.e., BTy ≤ c includesmi=1 yi = 1. Similarly, the mixed strategy z must satisfy the condition:nj=1 zj = 1.
It is easily seen that
n
j=1 zj = 1 is equivalent to both
n
j=1 zj ≤ 1 and−
n
j=1 zj ≤ −1. The system of inequalities and/or
equalities Ez ≥ d includes bothnj=1 zj ≤ 1 and−nj=1 zj ≤ −1, i.e., Ez ≥ d includesnj=1 zj = 1.
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Thus, a constrained matrix game Ameans that the payoff matrix of player I is A (hereby the payoff matrix of player II is
−A) and the sets of constrained strategies for players I and II are Y and Z , respectively.
Suppose that players I and II are playing a constrained matrix game A. If player I chooses any mixed strategy y ∈ Y and
player II chooses any mixed strategy z ∈ Z , then the expected payoff of player I can be computed as follows:
yTAz =
m
i=1
n
j=1
yiaijzj. (1)
Thus, player I should choose an optimal mixed strategy y∗ ∈ Y so that
min
z∈Z {y
∗TAz} = max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z {y
TAz} = ν (2)
ν is called the gain-floor for player I.
Similarly, player II should choose an optimal mixed strategy z∗ ∈ Z so as to obtain
max
y∈Y
{yTAz∗} = min
z∈Z maxy∈Y
{yTAz} = ω (3)
ω is called the loss-ceiling for player II.
Definition 1 ([1]). Assume that there exist mixed strategies y∗ ∈ Y and z∗ ∈ Z so that
y∗TAz∗ = max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z {y
TAz} = min
z∈Z maxy∈Y
{yTAz}. (4)
Then, (y∗, z∗) and ν = y∗TAz∗ are called a saddle point (in the sense of mixed strategies) and a value of the constrained
matrix game A, respectively.
In a similar way to classical matrix games [1,31], Eq. (4) is equivalent to the linear programming models as follows:
max{dTx}
s.t.

ETx− ATy ≤ 0
BTy ≤ c
x ≥ 0
y ≥ 0
(5)
and
min{cTs}
s.t.

Bs− Az ≥ 0
Ez ≥ d
s ≥ 0
z ≥ 0
(6)
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xq)T, s = (s1, s2, . . . , sp)T, y and z are decision variables.
It is easy to see that Eqs. (5) and (6) are a pair of primal–dual linear programming models. Therefore, if both Eqs. (5) and
(6) are feasible, then the constrained matrix game A has a value and a saddle point in the sense of mixed strategies, which
can be summarized as in the following theorems.
Theorem 1 ([1]). If both Eqs. (5) and (6) are feasible linear programming, then they have optimal solutions (y∗, x∗)T and (z∗, s∗)T,
respectively. Moreover, (y∗, z∗) and ν = y∗TAz∗ are the saddle point and the value of the constrainedmatrix gameA, respectively.
Theorem 2. If (y∗, x∗)T and (z∗, s∗)T respectively are feasible solutions of Eqs. (5) and (6) and dTx∗ = cTs∗, then (y∗, z∗) and
ν = dTx∗ = cTs∗ are the saddle point and the value of the constrained matrix game A, respectively.
Theorem 2 is easily proven by using the duality theorem of linear programming. The interested reader is referred to
Li [32] and Li and Cheng [33] for the detailed (omitted).
2.2. Triangular fuzzy numbers and Alpha-cuts
A fuzzy number b˜ with the membership function µb˜(x) is a special fuzzy subset on the set R of real numbers, which
satisfies the following conditions [4]:
(1) There exists at least a x0 ∈ R so that µb˜(x0) = 1.
(2) The membership function µb˜(x) is left and right continuous.
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TFNs are a special kind of fuzzy numbers. Let a˜ = (al, am, ar) be a TFN, whosemembership function is defined as follows:
µa˜ (x) =

(x− al)/(am − al) if al ≤ x < am
1 if x = am
(ar − x)/(ar − am) if am < x ≤ ar
0 else
(7)
where am is the mean of a˜, al and ar are the lower and upper limits of a˜, respectively.
Obviously, if al = am or am = ar , then the TFN a˜ = (al, am, ar) is reduced to an interval a = [aL, aR], where aL = al = am
or aR = am = ar . If al = am = ar then the TFN a˜ = (al, am, ar) is reduced to a real number a, where a = al = am = ar .
Conversely, intervals and real numbers are easily rewritten as TFNs. Therefore, TFNs are an extremely congenial class of
fuzzy numbers for representing imprecision and uncertainty such linguistics values and ill-quantity [29,30].
a˜ = (al, am, ar) is called a non-negative TFN if al ≥ 0 and one of the values al, am and ar is non-zero.
Let a˜ = (al, am, ar) and b˜ = (bl, bm, br) be two non-negative TFNs. Then, their arithmetical operations can be expressed
as follows:
a˜+ b˜ = (al + bl, am + bm, ar + br) (8)
and
λa˜ =

(λal, λam, λar) if λ ≥ 0
(λar , λam, λal) if λ < 0.
(9)
Eqs. (8) and (9) mean that the sum of TFNs and the product of a real number and a TFN are still TFNs.
A α-cut of a TFN a˜ = (al, am, ar) is defined as a˜(α) = {x|µa˜(x) ≥ α}, where α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, for any α ∈ [0, 1), we can
obtain a α-cut of the TFN a˜ = (al, am, ar), which is an interval, denoted by a˜(α) = [aL(α), aR(α)]. It is easily derived from
Eq. (7) that
aL(α) = αam + (1− α)al (10)
and
aR(α) = αam + (1− α)ar . (11)
Obviously, 1-cut and 0-cut are just the Core and Support of the TFN a˜ = (al, am, ar), respectively, i.e.,
a˜(1) = Core(a˜) = {x|µa˜(x) = 1} = am (12)
and
a˜(0) = Support(a˜) = {x|µa˜(x) > 0} = [al, ar ]. (13)
According to the operations over intervals [34–36], it readily follows that
[αam + (1− α)al, αam + (1− α)ar ] = αam + (1− α)[al, ar ]. (14)
Combining with Eqs. (10)–(13), Eq. (14) is easily rewritten as follows:
[aL(α), aR(α)] = αa˜(1)+ (1− α)a˜(0) = [αam + (1− α)al, αam + (1− α)ar ] (15)
i.e., any α-cut of a TFN can be directly obtained from both its 1-cut and 0-cut.
According to the representation theorem for the fuzzy set [29], using Eq. (15), a TFN a˜ = (al, am, ar) can be expressed as
follows:
a˜ =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ a˜(α)} =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ [aL(α), aR(α)]} (16)
where α ⊗ a˜(α) is defined as a fuzzy set, whose membership function is defined as follows:
µα⊗a˜(α)(x) =

α if x ∈ a˜(α)
0 otherwise (17)
i.e.,
µα⊗a˜(α)(x) =

α if aL(α) ≤ x ≤ aR(α)
0 otherwise. (18)
According to Eq. (15), Eq. (16) can be further rewritten as follows:
a˜ =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ [αa˜(1)+ (1− α)a˜(0)]}. (19)
436 D.-F. Li, F.-X. Hong / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 64 (2012) 432–446
Hence, it is easily derived from Eq. (19) that
µa˜(x) = max{α|x ∈ αa˜(1)+ (1− α)a˜(0)}. (20)
More specially, combining with Eqs. (12) and (13), Eq. (20) can be written as the same as Eq. (7). Thus, it is seen from
Eq. (19) that a TFN can be directly constructed by using both its 1-cut and 0-cut.
From the aforementioned discussion, we summarize the conclusion as in Theorem 3, which will be used to construct the
fuzzy values of constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs in Section 3.
Theorem 3. A TFN and its α-cuts have the relations (P1) and (P2) as follows:
(P1) Any α-cut of a TFN can be directly obtained from both its 1-cut and 0-cut.
(P2) Any TFN can be directly constructed by using both 1-cut and 0-cut.
3. Constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs and solution method
3.1. The concepts of Alpha-constrained matrix games and the values
Let us consider a constrained matrix game A˜ with payoffs of TFNs, where the payoff matrix of player I is given as
A˜ = (a˜ij)m×n, whose elements a˜ij (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) are TFNs stated as in Section 2.2.
Definition 2. For any α ∈ [0, 1], denote the payoff matrix of player I by A˜(α) = (a˜ij(α))m×n, whose elements a˜ij(α) (i =
1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) are α-cuts of the fuzzy payoffs a˜ij. Then, A˜(α) is called a α-constrained matrix game
corresponding to the constrained matrix game A˜ with payoffs of TFNs in the α-confidence level, which often is called the
α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) for short.
Definition 3. For any α ∈ [0, 1], if player I’s gain-floor ν˜(α) and player II’s loss-ceiling ρ˜(α) have a common value V˜ (α),
then V˜ (α) is called a value of the α-constrainedmatrix game A˜(α), or the α-constrainedmatrix game A˜(α) has a value V˜ (α),
where V˜ (α) = ν˜(α) = ρ˜(α).
Definition 3 is completely the same as that of classical matrix games, which is rational since it reflects that one player
wins the other player loses in the matrix game.
Definition 4. For any α ∈ [0, 1], if every α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) has a value V˜ (α), then the constrained matrix
game A˜with payoffs of TFNs has a fuzzy value V˜ , where V˜ = ∪α∈[0,1]{α ⊗ V˜ (α)}.
3.2. Alpha-constrained matrix games and auxiliary linear programming models
For the constrained matrix game A˜ with payoffs of TFNs stated as in the above Section 3.1, according to Eqs. (8) and (9),
the expected payoff for player I is computed as follows:
E˜ = yTA˜z =
m
i=1
n
j=1
a˜ijyizj =

m
i=1
n
j=1
alijyizj,
m
i=1
n
j=1
amij yizj,
m
i=1
n
j=1
arijyizj

(21)
which is a TFN.
Due to the fact that the constrainedmatrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs is zero-sum, then the expected payoff for player II
is obtained as follows:
−E˜ = yT(−A˜)z =
m
i=1
n
j=1
(−a˜ijyizj) =

−
m
i=1
n
j=1
arijyizj,−
m
i=1
n
j=1
amij yizj,−
m
i=1
n
j=1
alijyizj

(22)
which is still a TFN. Thus, in general, player I’s gain-floor and player II’s loss-ceiling should be TFNs, denoted by ν˜ =
(ν l, νm, νr) and ω˜ = (ωl, ωm, ωr), respectively. Moreover, it is easily proven that ν˜ ≤ ω˜ [12,13,33].
In a parallel way to the crisp constrained matrix games, if ν˜ = ω˜ then the common value V˜ is called the fuzzy value of
the constrainedmatrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs, where V˜ = ν˜ = ω˜. Obviously, V˜ is a TFN, denoted by V˜ = (V l, Vm, V r).
As far as we know, unfortunately, there is no method which can always ensure that ν˜ = ω˜ and hereby the constrained
matrix game with payoffs of TFNs has the fuzzy value. In this subsection, inspired by Li [28], according to Definitions 2–4,
we develop a linear programming method for solving any α-constrained matrix game.
For any α ∈ [0, 1], let us consider a α-constrained matrix game A˜(α), where the payoff matrix of player I is given as
A˜(α) = (a˜ij(α))m×n, whose elements a˜ij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) are the α-cuts of the TFN a˜ij = (alij, amij , arij).
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Stated as earlier, the α-cuts a˜ij(α) of the TFNs a˜ij = (alij, amij , arij) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) are intervals. It is easily
derived from Eq. (15) that
a˜ij(α) = [aLij(α), aRij(α)] = [αamij + (1− α)alij, αamij + (1− α)arij]. (23)
Namely, the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) is essentially the constrained matrix game with interval-valued payoffs.
For any given values aij(α) in the payoff intervals a˜ij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n), a payoff matrix is denoted
by A(α) = (aij(α))m×n. It is easily seen from Eq. (2) that the value v(α) of the constrained matrix game A(α) for player I
is closely related to all values aij(α), i.e., entries in the payoff matrix A(α). In other words, ν(α) is a function of the values
aij(α) in the payoff intervals a˜ij(α), denoted by ν(α) = υ(aij(α)) or ν(α) = υ(A(α)). Similarly, the optimal mixed strategy
y∗(α) ∈ Y of player I is also a function of the values aij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n), denoted by y∗(α) = y∗(aij(α))
or y∗(α) = y∗(A(α)).
In a similar way to the above analysis, the value ρ(α) and the optimal mixed strategy z∗(α) ∈ Z for player II in the
constrained matrix game A(α) are functions of the values aij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in the payoff intervals
a˜ij(α), denoted by ρ(α) = ω(aij(α)) (or ρ(α) = ω(A(α))) and z∗(α) = z∗(aij(α)) (or z∗(α) = z∗(A(α))), respectively.
According to Eqs. (1) and (2), it is easily proven that the gain-floor v(α) = υ(aij(α)) for player I is a monotonic and
non-decreasing function of the values aij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in the payoff intervals a˜ij(α). In fact, for any
values aij(α) and a′ij(α) in the payoff intervals a˜ij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n), if aij(α) ≤ a′ij(α) then we have
m
i=1
n
j=1
yiaij(α)zj ≤
m
i=1
n
j=1
yia′ij(α)zj (24)
since yi ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) and zj ≥ 0 (j = 1, 2, . . . , n), where y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z . Hence,
min
z∈Z

m
i=1
n
j=1
yiaij(α)zj

≤ min
z∈Z

m
i=1
n
j=1
yia′ij(α)zj

(25)
which directly implies that
max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z

m
i=1
n
j=1
yiaij(α)zj

≤ max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z

m
i=1
n
j=1
yia′ij(α)zj

(26)
i.e.,
ν(aij(α)) ≤ ν(a′ij(α)) (27)
or ν(A(α)) ≤ ν(A′(α)), where A′(α) = (a′ij(α))m×n is the payoff matrix of the constrained matrix game A′(α).
According to Theorems 1 and 2 or the mini-max theorem of constrained matrix games [1,32], if the constrained
matrix game A(α) = (aij(α))m×n has a value, then it is denoted by V (α) = V (aij(α)) or V (α) = V (A(α)). Obviously,
V (α) = ν(α) = ρ(α). From the above discussion, V (α) = V (aij(α)) is also a non-decreasing function of the values
aij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in the payoff intervals a˜ij(α).
For the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α), the expected payoffs of players are a linear combination of interval-valued
payoffs. Thus, from a viewpoint of logic of interval operations, the value of the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) should
be a closed interval as well [20,28]. Noticing the fact that the value ν(α) = ν(aij(α)) of the constrained matrix game
A(α) = (aij(α))m×n for player I is a non-decreasing function of the values aij(α) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) in
the payoff intervals a˜ij(α). Hence, the upper bound νR(α) of the interval-type value of the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α)
for player I can be obtained as follows:
νR(α) = max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z {y
TAR(α)z} = max
y∈Y
min
z∈Z

m
i=1
n
j=1
yiaRij(α)zj

(28)
where AR(α) = (aRij(α))m×n. According to Eq. (5), Eq. (28) is equivalent to the linear programming model as follows:
max{dTxR(α)}
s.t.

ETxR(α)− (AR(α))TyR(α) ≤ 0
BTyR(α) ≤ c
xR(α) ≥ 0
yR(α) ≥ 0
(29)
where xR(α) and yR(α) are decision variables.
438 D.-F. Li, F.-X. Hong / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 64 (2012) 432–446
If Eq. (29) is feasible linear programming, then using the Simplex method of linear programming [1], an optimal
solution of Eq. (29) is obtained, denoted by (xR∗(α), yR∗(α)). Thus, according to Theorem 2, we obtain the upper bound
νR(α) = dTxR∗(α) of player I’s gain-floor ν˜(α) and corresponding optimal mixed strategy yR∗(α) ∈ Y for the α-constrained
matrix game A˜(α).
Also, the lower bound νL(α) of player I’s gain-floor ν˜(α) and the optimalmixed strategy yL∗(α) ∈ Y for theα-constrained
matrix game A˜(α) are νL(α) = νL(aLij(α)) and yL∗ = yL∗(aLij(α)), respectively. According to Eq. (5), (νL(α), yL∗(α)) can be
obtained by solving the linear programming model as follows:
max{dTxL(α)}
s.t.

ETxL(α)− (AL(α))TyL(α) ≤ 0
BTyL(α) ≤ c
xL(α) ≥ 0
yL(α) ≥ 0
(30)
where xL(α) and yL(α) are decision variables.
If Eq. (30) is feasible linear programming, then it has an optimal solution, denoted by (yL∗(α), xL∗(α))T. Thus, according
to Theorem 2, we obtain the lower bound νL(α) = dTxL∗(α) of player I’s gain-floor ν˜(α) and corresponding optimal mixed
strategy yL∗(α) for the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α).
Thus, the lower bound νL(α) and the upper bound νR(α) of the interval-type value of theα-constrainedmatrix game A˜(α)
for player I can be obtained. Therefore, the value of the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) is a closed interval [νL(α), νR(α)].
Namely, ν˜(α) = [νL(α), νR(α)]. It is obvious that ν˜(α) is the α-cut of player I’s gain-floor ν˜ in the constrained matrix game
A˜with payoffs of TFNs.
In the same analysis to that of player I, the upper boundρR(α) of the interval-type value of theα-constrainedmatrix game
A˜(α) and corresponding optimal mixed strategy zR∗(α) ∈ Z for player II are ρR(α) = ωR(aRij(α)) and zR∗(α) = zR∗(aRij(α)),
respectively. According to Eq. (6), (ωR(α), zR∗(α)) can be obtained by solving the linear programming model as follows:
min{cTsR(α)}
s.t.

BsR(α)− AR(α)zR(α) ≥ 0
EzR(α) ≥ d
sR(α) ≥ 0
zR(α) ≥ 0
(31)
where sR(α) and zR(α) are decision variables.
If Eq. (31) is feasible linear programming, then using the Simplex method of linear programming, an optimal solution
is obtained, denoted by (zR∗(α), sR∗(α)). Thus, according to Theorem 2, we obtain the upper bound ωR(α) = cTsR∗(α) of
player II’s loss-ceiling ω˜(α) and corresponding optimal mixed strategy zR∗(α).
Likewise, the lower boundωL(α) of player II’s loss-ceiling ω˜(α) and corresponding optimalmixed strategy zL∗(α) ∈ Z are
ρL(α) = ωL(aLij(α)) and zL∗(α) = z∗(aLij(α)), respectively. According to Eq. (6), (ωL(α), zL∗(α)) can be obtained by solving
the linear programming model as follows:
min{cTsL(α)}
s.t.

BsL(α)− AL(α)zL(α) ≥ 0
EzL(α) ≥ d
sL(α) ≥ 0
zL(α) ≥ 0
(32)
where sL(α) and zL(α) are decision variables.
If Eq. (32) is feasible linear programming, then it has an optimal solution, denoted by (zL∗(α), sL∗(α))T. Thus, we obtain
the lower boundωL(α) = cTsL∗(α) of player II’s loss-ceiling ω˜(α) in the α-constrainedmatrix game A˜(α) and optimalmixed
strategy zL∗(α).
Thus, the lower bound ρL(α) and the upper bound ρR(α) of the interval-type value of the α-constrained matrix game
A˜(α) for player II can be obtained. Therefore, the value of the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) for player II is a closed
interval [ρL(α), ρR(α)]. Namely, ρ˜(α) = [ρL(α), ρR(α)]. It is obvious that ρ˜(α) is the α-cut of player II’s loss-ceiling ω˜ in
the constrained matrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs.
It is easily seen that Eqs. (29) and (31) are a pair of primal–dual linear programming problems. So themaximum of υR(α)
is equal to the minimum of ωR(α) according to the duality theorem of linear programming [1], i.e.,
νR(α) = ρR(α). (33)
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Likewise, Eqs. (30) and (32) are a pair of primal–dual linear programming problems. Hence,
νL(α) = ρL(α). (34)
Therefore, player I’s gain-floor ν˜(α) = [νL(α), νR(α)] is equal to player II’s loss-ceiling ρ˜(α) = [ρL(α), ρR(α)]. Namely,
both players have the common value. According to Definition 3, the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) has a value which
is also an interval, denoted by V˜ (α) = [V L(α), V R(α)]. Obviously, V˜ (α) = ν˜(α) = ρ˜(α), i.e., V L(α) = νL(α) = ρL(α)
and V R(α) = νR(α) = ρR(α). Furthermore, it is easily seen that V˜ (α) is the α-cut of the fuzzy value V˜ of the constrained
matrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs, where V˜ is the TFN stated as earlier. Thus, we can make the following conclusion as in
Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. For any α ∈ [0, 1], the α-constrained matrix game A˜(α) has an interval-type value V˜ (α) = [V L(α), V R(α)], whose
lower and upper bounds and corresponding optimal mixed strategies can be obtained through solving Eqs. (29) and (30) (or
Eqs. (31) and (32)), respectively.
Theorem 5. The constrainedmatrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs always has the fuzzy value V˜ , where V˜ = ∪α∈[0,1]{α⊗ V˜ (α)} =
∪α∈[0,1]{α ⊗ [V L(α), V R(α)]}.
Proof. For any α ∈ [0, 1], according to Theorem 4, the α-constrainedmatrix game A˜(α) has a value V˜ (α) = [V L(α), V R(α)].
Thus, according to Definition 4, it directly follows that the constrainedmatrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs has a fuzzy value
V˜ . Using Eq. (16), we have
V˜ =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ V˜ (α)} =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ [V L(α), V R(α)]}.  (35)
In particular, for α = 1, according to Eqs. (29) and (30) or Eqs. (31) and (32), the linear programming problems are
constructed as follows:
max{dTxR(1)}
s.t.

ETxR(1)− (AR(1))TyR(1) ≤ 0
BTyR(1) ≤ c
xR(1) ≥ 0
yR(1) ≥ 0
(36)
and
max{dTxL(1)}
s.t.

ETxL(1)− (AL(1))TyL(1) ≤ 0
BTyL(1) ≤ c
xL(1) ≥ 0
yL(1) ≥ 0
(37)
or
min{cTsR(1)}
s.t.

BsR(1)− AR(1)zR(1) ≥ 0
EzR(1) ≥ d
sR(1) ≥ 0
zR(1) ≥ 0
(38)
and
min{cTsL(1)}
s.t.

BsL(1)− AL(1)zL(1) ≥ 0
EzL(1) ≥ d
sL(1) ≥ 0
zL(1) ≥ 0
(39)
respectively.
Using the Simplex method of linear programming, we obtain the optimal solutions to Eqs. (36)–(39), respectively, where
νR(1) = dTxR(1), νL(1) = dTxL(1), ρR(1) = cTsR(1) and ρL(1) = cTsL(1). It is easily derived from Eqs. (33) and (34) that
[V L(1), V R(1)] = [νL(1), νR(1)] = [ρL(1), ρR(1)]. According to the notation of V˜ = (V l, Vm, V r), we have
Vm = V L(1) = νL(1) = V R(1) = νR(1) = ρL(1) = ρR(1). (40)
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That is to say, the mean of the fuzzy value V˜ of the constrained matrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs can be directly obtained
by solving one of Eqs. (36)–(39). In other words, the 1-cut or Core of the fuzzy value is obtained as V˜ (1) = Core(V˜ ) = Vm =
[νL(1), νR(1)] = [ρL(1), ρR(1)].
For α = 0, according to Eqs. (29) and (30) or Eqs. (31) and (32), the linear programming problems are constructed as
follows:
max{dTxR(0)}
s.t.

ETxR(0)− (AR(0))TyR(0) ≤ 0
BTyR(0) ≤ c
xR(0) ≥ 0
yR(0) ≥ 0
(41)
and
max{dTxL(0)}
s.t.

ETxL(0)− (AL(0))TyL(0) ≤ 0
BTyL(0) ≤ c
xL(0) ≥ 0
yL(0) ≥ 0
(42)
or
min{cTsR(0)}
s.t.

BsR(0)− AR(0)zR(0) ≥ 0
EzR(0) ≥ d
sR(0) ≥ 0
zR(0) ≥ 0
(43)
and
min{cTsL(0)}
s.t.

BsL(0)− AL(0)zL(0) ≥ 0
EzL(0) ≥ d
sL(0) ≥ 0
zL(0) ≥ 0
(44)
respectively.
Using the Simplex method of linear programming, we obtain the optimal solutions to Eqs. (41)–(44), respectively, where
νR(0) = dTxR(0), νL(0) = dTxL(0), ρR(0) = cTsR(0) and ρL(0) = cTsL(0). It is easily derived from Eqs. (33) and (34) that
[V L(0), V R(0)] = [νL(0), νR(0)] = [ρL(0), ρR(0)]. According to the notation of V˜ = (V l, Vm, V r), we have
V l = V L(0) = νL(0) = ρL(0), V r = V R(0) = νR(0) = ρR(0). (45)
That is to say, the lower limit and the upper limit of the fuzzy value V˜ of the constrainedmatrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs
can be directly obtained by solving Eqs. (41) and (42) or Eqs. (43) and (44). In other words, the 0-cut or Support of the fuzzy
value is obtained as V˜ (0) = Support(V˜ ) = [V l, V r ] = [νL(0), νR(0)] = [ρL(0), ρR(0)].
Theorem 6. The fuzzy value of the constrained matrix game A˜ with payoffs of TFNs can be expressed as follows:
V˜ =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ [αVm + (1− α)V l, αVm + (1− α)V r ]} (46)
which is just the TFN V˜ = (V l, Vm, V r), whose mean and the lower and upper limits can be obtained through solving Eqs. (36),
(41) and (42) (or one of Eqs. (37)–(39), (43) and (44)), respectively.
Proof. According to Eqs. (15), (40) and (45), any α-cut V˜ (α) = [V L(α), V R(α)] of the fuzzy value V˜ of the constrainedmatrix
game A˜with payoffs of TFNs can be obtained as follows:
V˜ (α) = αV˜ (1)+ (1− α)V˜ (0) = [αVm + (1− α)V l, αVm + (1− α)V r ] (47)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. According to Theorem 3, the fuzzy value V˜ can be expressed as follows:
V˜ =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ V˜ (α)} =

α∈[0,1]
{α ⊗ [αVm + (1− α)V l, αVm + (1− α)V r ]} (48)
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which directly implies that the membership function of V˜ is
µV˜ (x) = max{α|αVm + (1− α)V l ≤ x ≤ αVm + (1− α)V r} =
(x− V
l)/(Vm − V l) if V l ≤ x < Vm
1 if x = Vm
(V r − x)/(V r − Vm) if Vm < x ≤ V r .
(49)
Therefore, the fuzzy value V˜ of the constrained matrix game A˜with payoffs of TFNs is just the TFN (V l, Vm, V r). 
Theorem 6 shows that the fuzzy value V˜ of any constrained matrix game A˜ with payoffs of TFNs is a TFN, which can be
explicitly obtained through solving the derived three auxiliary linear programming models with all data taken from only
the 1-cut and 0-cut of the payoffs.
3.3. Algorithm for solving constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs
From the aforementioned discussion, the process and algorithm for solving constrained matrix games with payoffs of
TFNs are summarized as follows.
Step 1: Identify players, denoted by I and II;
Step 2: Identify pure strategies of players I and II, denoted the sets of pure strategies by S1 = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δm} and
S2 = {β1, β2, . . . , βn}, respectively;
Step 3: Identify constraint conditions of strategies’ choices for players I and II, denoted the sets of constrained strategies
by Y and Z , respectively;
Step 4: Pool opinions of outcomes for players I and II and estimate player I’s payoffs expressed with TFNs a˜ij =
(alij, a
m
ij , a
r
ij) (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . , n) and hereby construct the payoff matrix A˜ = (a˜ij)m×n;
Step 5: Construct and solve the linear programming problems according to Eqs. (29) and (30) (or Eqs. (31) and (32)) and
hereby obtain the value V˜ (α) and corresponding optimal mixed strategies of players for any α-constrained matrix game
A˜(α), where α ∈ [0, 1];
Step 6: Construct and solve the linear programming problem according to one of Eqs. (36)–(39) and hereby obtain Vm;
Step 7: Construct and solve the two linear programming problems according to Eqs. (41) and (42) (or Eqs. (43) and (44))
and hereby obtain V l and V r ;
Step 8: Construct the fuzzy value V˜ of the constrained matrix game A˜ with payoffs of TFNs according to the obtained
values Vm, V l and V r . Namely, the TFN V˜ = (V l, Vm, V r) is explicitly obtained.
4. Numerical example and computational result comparison
Suppose that there are two business companies p1 and p2 aiming to enhance the market share of an electronic product
in a targeted market under the circumstance that the demand amount of the electronic product in the targeted market
basically is fixed. In other words, the market share of one company increases while the market share of another company
decreases. The two companies are considering about twopure strategies to increase themarket share: strategy δ1 (improving
technology), δ2 (advertisement). The company p1 needs the funds 80 and 50 (million yuan) when it takes pure strategies δ1
and δ2, respectively. However, due to the lack of the funds, the company p1 only provides 60 (million yuan), i.e., the mixed
strategies of the company p1 may satisfy the constraint condition: 80y1 + 50y2 ≤ 60. Similarly, the company p2 needs
the funds 40 and 70 (million yuan) when it takes pure strategies δ1 and δ2, respectively. The company p2 only provides
50 (million yuan), i.e., the mixed strategies of the company p2 may satisfy the constraint condition: 40z1 + 70z2 ≤ 50 or
−40z1 − 70z2 ≥ −50. Due to a lack of information or imprecision of the available information, the managers of the two
companies usually are not able to exactly forecast the sales amount of the companies’ product. Hence, TFNs are suitable to
represent the sales amount of the product fromboth companies’ perspectives. Thus, the above problemmay be regarded as a
constrainedmatrix gamewith payoffs of TFNs. Namely, the companies p1 and p2 are regarded as players I and II, respectively.
The sets of constrained strategies are expressed as follows:
Y0 = {y|80y1 + 50y2 ≤ 60, y1 + y2 ≤ 1,−y1 − y2 ≤ −1, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0}
and
Z0 = {z| − 40z1 − 70z2 ≥ −50, z1 + z2 ≤ 1,−z1 − z2 ≤ −1, z1 ≥ 0, z2 ≥ 0}
respectively. Let us consider the specific constrained matrix game A˜0 with payoffs of TFNs, where the payoff matrix is given
as follows:
A˜0 =

(27, 29, 35) (−25,−19,−17)
(−11,−10,−5) (35, 40, 41)

where the element (27, 29, 35) in thematrix A˜0 is a TFN,which indicates that the sales amount of the product for the company
p1 is between 27 and 35 when the companies p1 and p2 use the pure strategy δ1 (improving technology) simultaneously.
Other elements (i.e., TFNs) in the matrix A˜0 can be explained similarly.
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Coefficient matrices and vectors of the constrained sets Y0 and Z0 for the companies p1 and p2 are obtained as follows:
B =

80 1 −1
50 1 −1

, ET =
−40 1 −1
−70 1 −1

and
c = (60, 1,−1)T, d = (−50, 1,−1)T
respectively.
4.1. Computational results obtained by the proposed method
According to Eq. (36), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows:
max{−50xR1(1)+ xR2(1)− xR3(1)}
s.t.

−40xR1(1)+ xR2(1)− xR3(1)− 29yR1(1)+ 10yR2(1) ≤ 0
−70xR1(1)+ xR2(1)− xR3(1)+ 19yR1(1)− 40yR2(1) ≤ 0
80yR1(1)+ 50yR2(1) ≤ 60
yR1(1)+ yR2(1) ≤ 1
−yR1(1)− yR2(1) ≤ −1
xR1(1), x
R
2(1), x
R
3(1), y
R
1(1), y
R
2(1) ≥ 0.
(50)
Solving Eq. (50) using the Simplex method of linear programming [1], an optimal solution (xR∗(1), yR∗(1)) can be
obtained, where yR∗(1) = (1/3, 2/3)T and xR∗(1) = (0, 3, 0)T. Therefore, the mean νm of the gain-floor for the company p1
and the optimal mixed strategy ym∗ are νm = νR(1) = dTxR∗(1) = 3 and ym∗ = yR∗(1) = (1/3, 2/3)T, respectively.
According to Eq. (41), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows:
max{−50xR1(0)+ xR2(0)− xR3(0)}
s.t.

−40xR1(0)+ xR2(0)− xR3(0)− 35yR1(0)+ 5yR2(0) ≤ 0
−70xR1(0)+ xR2(0)− xR3(0)+ 17yR1(0)− 41yR2 ≤ 0
80yR1(0)+ 50yR2(0) ≤ 60
yR1(0)+ yR2(0) ≤ 1
−yR1(0)− yR2(0) ≤ −1
xR1(0), x
R
2(0), x
R
3(0), y
R
1(0), y
R
2(0) ≥ 0.
(51)
Solving Eq. (51) using the Simplex method of linear programming [1], an optimal solution (xR∗(0), yR∗(0)) can be
obtained, where yR∗(0) = (1/3, 2/3)T and xR∗(0) = (0, 8.3333, 0)T. Therefore, the upper limit νr of the gain-floor for
the company p1 and the optimal mixed strategy yr
∗
are νr = νR(0) = dTxR∗(0) = 8.3333 and yr∗ = yR∗(0) = (1/3, 2/3)T,
respectively.
Similarly, according to Eq. (42), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows:
max{−50xL1(0)+ xL2(0)− xL3(0)}
s.t.

40xL1(0)+ xL2(0)− xL3(0)− 27yL1(0)+ 11yL2(0) ≤ 0
−70xL1(0)+ xL2(0)− xL3(0)+ 25yL1(0)− 35yL2(0) ≤ 0
80yL1(0)+ 50yL2(0) ≤ 60
yL1(0)+ yL2(0) ≤ 1
−yL1(0)− yL2(0) ≤ −1
xL1(0), x
L
2(0), x
L
3(0), y
L
1(0), y
L
2(0) ≥ 0.
(52)
Solving Eq. (52) using the Simplex method of linear programming [1], an optimal solution (xL∗(0), yL∗(0)) can be
obtained, where yL∗(0) = (1/3, 2/3)T and xL∗(0) = (0, 1.6667, 0)T. Therefore, the lower limit ν l of the gain-floor for
the company p1 and the optimal mixed strategy y l
∗
are ν l = νL(0) = dTxL∗(0) = 1.6667 and y l∗ = yL∗(0) = (1/3, 2/3)T,
respectively. Thus, the gain-floor of the company p1 is a TFN ν˜ = (ν l, νm, νr) = (1.6667, 3, 8.3333), whose membership
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function is given as follows:
µv˜∗(x) =

(x− 1.6667)/1.3333 if 1.6667 ≤ x < 3
1 if x = 3
(8.3333− x)/5.3333 if 3 < x ≤ 8.3333
0 else.
(53)
Similarly, According to Eq. (38), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows:
min{60sR1(1)+ sR2(1)− sR3(1)}
s.t.

80sR1(1)+ sR2(1)− sR3(1)− 29zR1 (1)+ 19zR2 (1) ≥ 0
50sR1(1)+ sR2(1)− sR3(1)+ 10zR1 (1)− 40zR2 (1) ≥ 0
−40zR1 (1)− 70zR2 (1) ≥ −50
zR1 (1)+ zR2 (1) ≥ 1
−zR1 (1)− zR2 (1) ≥ −1
sR1(1), s
R
2(1), s
R
3(1), z
R
1 (1), z
R
2 (1) ≥ 0.
(54)
Solving Eq. (54) using the Simplex method of linear programming, an optimal solution (sR∗(1), zR∗(1)) can be obtained,
where zR∗(1) = (1, 0)T and sR∗(1) = (1.3000, 0, 75.0000)T. Therefore, the mean ωm of the loss-ceiling for the company p2
and the optimal mixed strategy zm∗ are ωm = ωR(1) = dTsR∗(1) = 3 and zm∗ = zR∗(1) = (1, 0)T, respectively.
Likewise, according to Eq. (43), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows:
min{60sR1(0)+ sR2(0)− sR3(0)}
s.t.

80sR1(0)+ sR2(0)− sR3(0)− 35zR1 (0)+ 17zR2 (0) ≥ 0
50sR1(0)+ sR2(0)− sR3(0)+ 5zR1 (0)− 41zR2 (0) ≥ 0
−40zR1 (0)− 70zR2 (0) ≥ −50
zR1 (0)+ zR2 (0) ≥ 1
−zR1 (0)− zR2 (0) ≥ −1
sR1(0), s
R
2(0), s
R
3(0), z
R
1 (0), z
R
2 (0) ≥ 0.
(55)
Solving Eq. (55) using the Simplex method of linear programming, an optimal solution (sR∗(0), zR∗(0)) can be obtained,
where zR∗(0) = (1, 0)T and sR∗(0) = (1.3333, 0, 71.6667)T, respectively. Therefore, the upper limit ωr of the loss-ceiling
for the company p2 and the optimal mixed strategy zr
∗
are ωr = ωR(0) = dTsR∗(0) = 8.3333 and zr∗ = zR∗(0) = (1, 0)T,
respectively.
According to Eq. (44), the linear programming model can be constructed as follows:
min{60sL1(0)+ sL2(0)− sL3(0)}
s.t.

80sL1(0)+ sL2(0)− sL3(0)− 27zL1(0)+ 25zL2(0) ≥ 0
50sL1(0)+ sL2(0)− sL3(0)+ 11zL1(0)− 35zL2(0) ≥ 0
−40zL1(0)− 70zL2(0) ≥ −50
zL1(0)+ zL2(0) ≥ 1
−zL1(0)− zL2(0) ≥ −1
sL1(0), s
L
2(0), s
L
3(0), z
L
1(0), z
L
2(0) ≥ 0.
(56)
Solving Eq. (56) using the Simplex method of linear programming, an optimal solution (sL∗(0), zL∗(0)) can be obtained,
where zL∗(0) = (1, 0)T and sL∗(0) = (1.2667, 0, 74.3333)T. Therefore, the lower limitωl of the loss-ceiling for the company
p2 and the optimal mixed strategy z l
∗
are ωl = ωL(0) = dTsL∗(0) = 1.6667 and z l∗ = zL∗(0) = (1, 0)T, respectively. Thus,
the loss-ceiling of the company p2 is a TFN ω˜ = (ωl, ωm, ωr) = (1.6667, 3, 8.3333).
Obviously, ν˜ = ω˜ = (1.6667, 3, 8.3333), i.e., the companies p1 and p2 have a common TFN-type value. Therefore,
the constrained matrix game A˜0 with payoffs of TFNs has the TFN-type fuzzy value (1.6667, 3, 8.3333), i.e., V˜ =
(1.6667, 3, 8.3333).
4.2. Computational results without considering constrained strategies
If both companies do not take into account the constraints of the strategies, then the above market share problem may
be regarded as an unconstrainedmatrix game A˜′0 with payoffs of TFNs [28]. Thus, using the method for solving interval-type
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values ofmatrix gameswith interval-valued payoffs given by Li [28], we construct the linear programmingmodel as follows:
min{x′R1 (1)+ x
′R
2 (1)}
s.t.

29x
′R
1 (1)− 10x
′R
2 (1) ≥ 1
−19x′R1 (1)+ 40x
′R
2 (1) ≥ 1
x
′R
1 (1) ≥ 0, x
′R
2 (1) ≥ 0
(57)
where x
′R
1 (1) and x
′R
2 (1) are decision variables.
Similarly, the two linear programming models are constructed as follows:
min{x′R1 (0)+ x
′R
2 (0)}
s.t.

35x
′R
1 (0)− 5x
′R
2 (0) ≥ 1
−17x′R1 (0)+ 41x
′R
2 (0) ≥ 1
x
′R
1 (0) ≥ 0, x
′R
2 (0) ≥ 0
(58)
and
min{x′L1 (0)+ x
′L
2 (0)}
s.t.

27x
′L
1 (0)− 11x
′L
2 (0) ≥ 1
−25x′L1 (0)+ 35x
′L
2 (0) ≥ 1
x
′L
1 (0) ≥ 0, x
′L
2 (0) ≥ 0
(59)
where x
′R
1 (0), x
′R
2 (0), x
′L
1 (0) and x
′L
2 (0) are decision variables.
Using the Simplex method of linear programming, an optimal solution x′m∗ = x′R∗(1) = (x′R∗1 (1), x′R∗2 (1))T of Eq. (57)
is easily obtained, where x
′m∗
1 = 0.0515 and x′m∗2 = 0.0495. By the method given by Li [28], the mean ν ′m and the optimal
mixed strategy y ′m∗ for player I can be obtained, where
ν
′m = ν ′R(1) = 1/(x′R∗1 (1)+ x
′R∗
2 (1)) = 9.8980 (60)
and
y
′m∗
1 = y
′R∗
1 (1) = x
′R∗
1 (1)/(x
′R∗
1 (1)+ x
′R∗
2 (1)) = 0.5102 (61)
y
′m∗
2 = y
′R∗
2 (1) = x
′R∗
2 (1)/(x
′R∗
1 (1)+ x
′R∗
2 (1)) = 0.4898 (62)
respectively.
Similarly, solving Eqs. (58) and (59), the optimal solutions are obtained as follows:
ν
′r = 13.7755, y ′r∗ = (0.4694, 0.5306)T (63)
and
ν
′ l = 6.8367, y ′ l∗ = (0.4694, 0.5306)T (64)
respectively.
Therefore, the gain-floor of the company p1 is a TFN ν˜ ′ = (ν ′ l, ν ′m, ν ′r) = (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755), whosemembership
function is given as follows:
µv˜′(x) =

(x− 6.8367)/3.0613 if 6.8367 ≤ x < 9.8980
1 if x = 9.8980
(13.7755− x)/3.8775 if 9.8980 < x ≤ 13.7755
0 else.
(65)
Likewise, using the method given by Li [28], we have
ω
′m = 9.8980, z ′m∗ = (0.6020, 0.3980)T (66)
ω
′r = 13.7755, z ′r∗ = (0.5918, 0.4082)T (67)
and
ω
′ l = 6.8367, z ′ l∗ = (0.6122, 0.3878)T (68)
respectively. Then, the loss-celling of the company p2 is a TFN ω˜′ = (ω′ l, ω′m, ω′r) = (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755).
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Thus, the companies p1 and p2 have a common TFN-type value, i.e., ν˜ ′ = ω˜′ = (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755). Hereby
the unconstrained matrix game A˜′0 with payoffs of TFNs has the TFN-type fuzzy value (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755), i.e.,
V˜ ′ = (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755).
It is easily seen that the value V˜ ′ = (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755) and the corresponding optimal mixed strategies for
the companies p1 and p2 in the unconstrained matrix game A˜′0 with payoffs of TFNs are different from the value V˜ =
(1.6667, 3, 8.3333) and the corresponding optimal mixed strategies in the constrained matrix game A˜0 with payoffs of
TFNs. Moreover, V˜ ′ = (6.8367, 9.8980, 13.7755) is larger than V˜ = (1.6667, 3, 8.3333). These conclusions are accordance
with the actual situation as expected. On the other hand, it is shown that it is necessary to consider the constraint conditions
of strategies in real situations.
5. Conclusion
Fuzzy constrained matrix games can provide a basic conceptual framework for formulating and analyzing antagonistic
decision problems in which there are some sources of imprecision and uncertainty on payoffs of outcomes and strategies
are constrained due to some objective conditions. In this paper, we introduce the concepts of α-constrained matrix games
for constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs and the values. Using the duality theorem of linear programming and
the representation theorem for the fuzzy set, we prove that any α-constrained matrix game has an interval-type value and
hereby any constrainedmatrix gamewith payoffs of TFNs has a TFN-type value. These conclusions are in accordancewith the
viewpoints of both logic of TFN operations and the ‘‘zero-sum’’ concept of matrix games. The auxiliary linear programming
models are derived to compute the interval-type value and optimalmixed strategies of players for any α-constrainedmatrix
game, i.e., the α-cut of the TFN-type fuzzy value and corresponding optimal mixed strategies for any constrained matrix
game with payoffs of TFNs in any α-confidence level. Particularly, the mean and the lower and upper limits of the TFN-
type fuzzy value of the constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs can be directly obtained through solving the derived
three linear programming models with all data taken from only 1-cut and 0-cut of payoffs. Hence the fuzzy value of the
constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs can be easily and explicitly constructed.
It is obvious that constrained matrix game with payoffs of TFNs are a special case of constrained matrix games. In fact,
if all the TFN-type payoffs degenerate to real numbers, i.e., aij = alij = amij = arij, then the constrained matrix games with
payoffs of TFNs are reduced to the constrainedmatrix games with crisp payoffs. Hence, the linear programmingmodels (i.e.,
Eqs. (29)–(32)) are reduced to those (i.e., Eqs. (5) and (6)) of the constrained matrix games. Furthermore, if we do not take
into account the constraints of players’ strategies, the linear programming models (i.e., Eqs. (29)–(32)) are reduced to those
of the classical matrix games [1].
Although the proposed models and method are illustrated with the example of the market share problem as one of the
possible applications [37], it is expected that they may be applied to solving many competitive decision making problems
in similar fields such as economics, finance, management and biology.
Obviously, the method in this paper is developed to solve constrained matrix games with payoffs of TFNs, which are a
special form of fuzzy numbers and easily identified with three parameters. In reality, however, there are various forms of
fuzzy numbers such as L − R fuzzy numbers, trapezoidal fuzzy numbers and convex fuzzy numbers. Using these universal
fuzzy numbers to extract and describe imprecision and uncertainty of outcomes in games is worth studying. And effective
and practical methods need to be developed for solving such constrained matrix games with payoffs of these universal
fuzzy numbers. Moreover, there is a possible direction that the idea of this paper is applied to solving many-person non-
cooperative games.
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